Adi Robertson

Nielson says it’s not an accurate read of the law, but Roberts expresses apprehension about whether it would really be possible to pull out of the state in a way that satisfies its requirements. “I don’t see how they can wall off Texas,” he says.

Amy Coney Barrett suggests HB 20’s scope is more limited than Florida’s equivalent law, saying it only covers the “classic social media sites” like Facebook, not platforms like Etsy. Nielson agrees with her, and weirdly nobody brings up Wikipedia — whose operators have expressed concern they’d be covered by the law.

Nielson is defending HB 20 now. A group of legal scholars, he points out, worry that striking down the Texas law could make tech company regulation in general impossible — although even they call the Texas law “dangerous.”

Clement mentioned what he calls a “Hotel California” provision of HB 20, which he interprets as a ban on companies pulling out of Texas if they can’t meet its legal burdens. Brown Jackson questions whether that’s a reasonable interpretation of the law; she seems less convinced it’s the right read.

A lot of today’s fight has been about metaphors, and Alito is questioning whether some of them make sense — a newspaper in NetChoice’s view, and a common carrier like a telegram company in the states.’ Clement points out that the court has regulated the internet specifically before in cases like Reno v. ACLU, which struck down most of the Communications Decency Act. Unfortunately, that doesn’t really clear up the metaphor question.

Clement fields a question from the court on why Texas’ requirement to explain social media takedowns is more problematic than EU laws requiring some level of consistent moderation and explanation — he argues that Texas’ individual response provision would be “incredibly burdensome.”

Several justices (both liberal and conservative) have seemed sympathetic to the idea that private companies can engage in harmful censorship, with Alito referring to the possibility as “Orwellian.” But Kavanaugh keeps pushing back on the premise. “We don’t want the state interfering” with these private entities, he says, even if they’re powerful.

Speaking to US Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, he suggests Section 230 is conditioned on the idea that web platforms are common carriers. That’s a weird take on Section 230, which is regularly applied to small blogs and online newsletters — and was passed partly to avoid punishing services that moderated content to be “family friendly” rather than acting as neutral conduits. Prelogar, for what it’s worth, disagrees with Gorsuch.

Brown Jackson brings up a common critique of NetChoice’s position: the internet has become the public square, and large social media companies play a huge gatekeeper role, so why not regulate them? NetChoice’s Clement argues that web platforms rise (he mentions TikTok) and fall (sorry, X) quickly enough that it’s clear there are lots of avenues for speech online.

It’s been brought up by other justices in passing, but Thomas really keeps harping on whether striking down this law should mean Section 230 is unjustifiable. He’s bringing up some questions that are interesting but also pretty tangential to the core case, like whether “deep learning algorithms” are platform speech. (Clement says... probably.) “What is the algorithm saying?” Thomas asks.